AK-47: The Weapon that Changed the Face of War Read online

  Table of Contents

  OTHER BOOKS BY LARRY KAHANER

  Title Page

  Copyright Page

  Epigraph

  Acknowledgments

  AUTHOR’S NOTE

  Introduction

  Chapter 1 - PROTECTING THE MOTHERLAND

  Chapter 2 - A REPUTATION BORN IN THE RICE PADDIES

  Chapter 3 - PANDORA’S BOX

  Chapter 4 - THE AFRICAN CREDIT CARD

  Chapter 5 - THE KALASHNIKOV CULTURE REACHES LATIN AMERICA

  Chapter 6 - KALASHNIKOV AND HIS GUN VISIT AMERICA

  Chapter 7 - THE UNITED NATIONS TAKES ON THE TRUE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

  Chapter 8 - AK VERSUS M-16: PART 2

  Chapter 9 - THE SECOND SELLING OF THE AK

  EPILOGUE

  NOTES

  INDEX

  OTHER BOOKS BY LARRY KAHANER

  Nonfiction

  Values, Prosperity, and the Talmud:

  Business Lessons from the Ancient Rabbis

  The Quotations of Chairman Greenspan:

  Words from the Man Who Can Shake the World

  Competitive Intelligence:

  How to Gather, Analyze, and Use Information

  to Move Your Business to the Top

  Say It and Live It:

  The 50 Corporate Mission Statements

  That Hit the Mark (coauthor)

  Cults That Kill:

  Probing the Underworld of Occult Crime

  On the Line:

  How MCI Took on At&T—and Won!

  The Phone Book:

  The Most Complete Guide to the Changing

  World of Telephones (coauthor)

  Fiction

  Naked Prey

  (pseudonym Larry Kane)

  This book is printed on acid-free paper.

  Copyright © 2007 by Larry Kahaner. All rights reserved

  Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey

  Published simultaneously in Canada

  Design and composition by Navta Associates, Inc.

  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600, or on the web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

  Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and the author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.

  For general information about our other products and services, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at (800) 762-2974, outside the United States at (317) 572-3993 or fax (317) 572-4002.

  Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. For more information about Wiley products, visit our web site at www.wiley.com.

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

  Kahaner, Larry.

  AK-47 : the weapon that changed the face of war / Larry Kahaner.

  p. cm.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN-13 978-0-471-72641-8 (cloth: alk. paper)

  ISBN-10 0-471-72641-9 (cloth: alk. paper)

  1. AK-47 rifle. I. Title

  UD395.A16K 2006

  623.4’424—dc22

  2006004501

  In some places, an AK-47 assault rifle can be bought for as little as . . . a bag of grain. They are easy to use: with minimal training, even a child can wield one. They are easy to conceal and transport. Since they require little maintenance, they can last for decades.

  —UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN

  That rifle hanging on the wall of the working-class flat or labourer’s cottage is the symbol of democracy. It is our job to see that it stays there.

  —GEORGE ORWELL

  I’m proud of my invention, but I’m sad that it is used by terrorists. I would prefer to have invented a machine that people could use and that would help farmers with their work—for example, a lawnmower.

  —MIKHAIL T. KALASHNIKOV

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  I have many people to thank for their help in researching and writing this book. Some of them spent a great deal of their time with me; others helped me over some rough spots, offering ideas or a different way of looking at things that moved me along.

  I am grateful for early assistance from: Glen Senkowski, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, who offered stories about his Vietnam War experience when he often used an AK instead of his army-issued M-16; Doug Wicklund, Senior Curator, National Firearms Museum, who showed me his personal AKs as well as those in the museum and pointed out their salient features; Duncan Long, firearms author, who posited his ideas on the AK’s success; Mark Schwartz, who offered insights on combat tactics of World War II; Rachel J. Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information, whose research on the importance of small arms helped me better understand their impact; William Addison Hurst, one of Kalashnikov’s hosts on his first trip to the United States; Rick Davis, who offered technical insights on the AK; Mark Bromley, Research Associate, Arms Transfers Project, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Matthew P. Caulfield, Major General, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), Executive Director, Helmets to Hardhats; Vadim Dabrov, creator of www.ak47-guide.com, a useful e-book source about the Kalashnikov Museum; the staff of the Small Arms Survey, produced by the International Action Network on Small Arms, for sharing their data; moderators and members of the Guns Network, whose web site www.ak-47.net was a great source of quick answers about the minutiae of the AK; Larry Zilliox, President, Investigative Research Specialists, LLC, for his help in unearthing government documents; and Karl Bickel, Senior Policy Analyst, Department of Justice, for insights on police and assault rifles.

  Thanks go to those in my writer’s group, which has been meeting monthly for almost fifteen years: Allen Appel, Audie Appel, Dan Stashower, John McKeon, and Marc Smolonsky, all authors and writers in their own right; Doug Starr, a longtime friend who keeps me from stepping into literary hot water; Adam Firestone, who spent time with me at the National Rifle Association range so I could understand better the shooting profiles of the M-16 and AK; special thanks go to Charlie Cutshaw, firearms expert and journalist, for his technical reading of the manuscript; my agent, Gail Ross, of the Gail Ross Literary Agency and her creative director, Howard Yoon, for understanding the importance of this book and propelling the project to completion; my editor, Eric Nelson, for his insights and wisdom; and my wife, Robin Latham, herself an accomplished author and writer, for her editin
g and support.

  AUTHOR’S NOTE

  Despite repeated requests, Mikhail Kalashnikov declined to be interviewed for this book.

  Now in his eighties, Kalashnikov has become a sympathetic and tragic figure. He continues to grant shorter interviews to newspapers and magazines, often at public events, allowing him to advertise his brand of vodka, refute critics of his weapons’ global destructive power, and drum up business for the Russian arms makers that he represents with his new celebrity status.

  Fortunately, the story of Kalashnikov, the AK-47, and its effect on world history is available from open-source material, as well as from private and confidential sources I have cultivated. I drew on all of these for the information in this book.

  INTRODUCTION

  ON MARCH 23, 2003, under the cover of darkness, thirty-two U.S. Army Apache attack helicopters flew into Baghdad in advance of coalition forces moving northward on the ground toward the capital city. The choppers were on a search-and-destroy mission to find Saddam Hussein’s elite Republican Guard, who reportedly were deployed in a semicircle to protect the southern part of town. In the hours leading up to this mission, Saddam’s main artillery positions had been pounded by American surface-to-surface missiles and ATACMS rockets carrying 950 half-pound bombs. The remaining enemy forces would then be wiped out by these low-flying $22 million machines, equipped with 30mm cannons and state-of-the-art Longbow radar systems that could direct Hellfire antitank missiles at multiple targets.

  Yet as the Apaches settled into position, something unexpected happened. The lights on the outskirts of Baghdad shut off, as if hit by a blackout. Then, just as mysteriously, they came back on two minutes later.

  The U.S. Army pilots did not realize the lights were a signal to attack.

  What happened next shocked even the most seasoned combat veterans. The Apache helicopters were attacked from all directions by the world’s most prolific and effective combat weapon, a device so cheap and simple that it can be bought in many countries for less than the cost of a live chicken. This weapon, depicted on the flag and currency of several countries, waved defiantly by guerrillas and rebels around the world, has changed the geopolitical landscape of the post-cold war era. It has been responsible for more than a quarter million deaths every year. It is the undisputed firearm of choice for at least fifty legitimate standing armies, along with untold numbers of disenfranchised fighting forces ranging from international insurgents and terrorists to domestic drug dealers and street gangs.

  It is the AK-47 assault rifle.

  As the Apaches hovered in position, they took thousands of rounds of gunfire from Iraqi ground troops. Thirty-one of the thirty-two helicopters sustained damage; all had to abort their mission. One was downed and two pilots captured. Pentagon officials do not know if the chopper was shot down or suffered mechanical problems. A pilot who made it back safely said, “It was coming from all directions. I got shot front, back, left, and right.” Springfield, Massachusetts, pilot Bob Duffney, who flew combat helicopters in the 1991 Gulf War, added, “In Desert Storm, we didn’t have a firefight like this.”

  For all of the billions of dollars spent by the United States military on space-age weapons and technology, the AK still remains the most devastating weapon on the planet. Its banana-shaped magazine gives this gun a familiar silhouette that makes it a symbol of third world rebellion and power. Unlike the scourge of land mines in the world, the eighty to one hundred million AKs manufactured and distributed since the rifle’s invention in 1947 pose a more dangerous threat because they can be easily transported, repaired, and used by roving bands of assailants. The AK has made possible coups in Africa, terrorist raids in the Middle East, and bank robberies in Los Angeles. It has become a cultural icon, its signature shape defining in our consciousness what a deadly rifle is supposed to look like.

  Why has the AK earned such a legendary reputation? The gun has few moving parts so it hardly ever jams. It is resistant to heat, cold, rain, and sand. It doesn’t always shoot straight, but in close combat its awesome firepower (600 rounds a minute) and reliability give it a nod over more sophisticated weapon designs, such as the M-16. American GIs in Vietnam reported that AKs buried in rice paddies for six months or more, unearthed filthy and rusted shut, fired perfectly after kicking the action bolt with the heel of a boot.

  In scenarios played throughout the world’s hot spots like Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and the Gaza Strip, low-tech AKs are besting superior military training and weaponry. In Iraq, for example, insurgents recently have inflicted demoralizing casualties on U.S. troops mainly with simple tactics such as bombings, kidnapping, and massive small-arms fire with AKs. American troops are hamstrung, forced to fight street to street where the AK allows an everyday citizen to be just as deadly as a professionally trained, well-armored, and physically fit U.S. soldier. Because explosions kill enough people to make newspaper headlines, most Americans think that’s how Iraqis and U.S. troops are killing and dying. In fact, small arms still kill more people in Iraq than the touted improvised explosive device.

  Why the U.S. military as a whole has been so slow to recognize this “new” face of war remains a mystery, because individual soldiers, those on the ground, understand it. “It’s somewhat frustrating,” Colonel Bill Wolf, former commander of the army’s 11th Aviation Regiment, said. Referring to long-standing U.S. policies about civilian casualties, he added, “We can’t take out a street block because of the way we go to war.”

  This “way we go to war” doesn’t work anymore, and some would argue it never did once the Russian assault rifle spread throughout the world and became as ubiquitous as the common cold. Today’s wars are small, hot conflicts in urban areas, where sophisticated and expensive weapons are no match for AK-carrying rebels who need little training and know the local terrain better. This sentiment was expressed by Major General William J. Livsey Jr., the commandant of Fort Benning, the infantry headquarters and school, in the early 1980s. The military was going through a monumental change at the time because computer chips were being integrated into the first generation of smart weapons. The army was enamored of the complexity and promise of these smart weapons. “Despite all the sophisticated weapons we or the Soviets come up with, you still have to get that one lone infantryman, with his rifle, off his piece of land. It’s the damn hardest thing in the world to do.”

  The AK has shifted the balance of power in warfare by allowing small factions, not armies, to overthrow entire governments. Charles Taylor, a Liberian-born, U.S.-educated preacher, proved this in 1989 when he and a ragtag cadre of a hundred men armed with AKs, stormed the presidential palace in Liberia and controlled the country for the next six years. By issuing AKs to anyone who swore allegiance to the new regime, Taylor stayed in power with bands of thug soldiers, all of whom were allowed to pillage their defeated enemies as payment for their loyalty.

  On the other side of the continent, Mozambique’s flag and coins display an AK as homage to the weapon that brought this nation its freedom. Ironically, the United Nations estimates that the country is awash in millions of undocumented AKs left behind from civil war. As long as the AKs remain, the seeds of instability stay rooted in Mozambique’s land.

  War has changed; it no longer has to be about border disagreements, ideology, or political differences. Through the power of AK assault rifles, factions can roam through a country, terrorize its citizenry, and grab the spoils.

  They can even keep a superpower at bay.

  Consider the U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu during the now famous “Black Hawk Down” incident in 1993 (later made into a Hollywood film by the same name). Eighteen American soldiers were killed and many more wounded during several days of bitter street fighting that eventually led to the resignation of the secretary of defense and a total U.S. troop withdrawal from Somalia. Yusuf Hassan of the BBC’s Somali service, who covered the action, said during one of his broadcasts, “It [the film] was sort of portraying the Americans as heroes, w
hen in fact they had all the technology. It was a high-tech war against people who only had AK-47 rifles.” (To be fair, they also had rocket-propelled grenades and a variety of machine guns.)

  Despite this thrashing in Somalia, the message never seems to reach decision makers: superpowers with superweapons are no match for a determined warrior with an assault rifle. Afghani general Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and U.S. Army lieutenant colonel Lester W. Grau wrote for the Foreign Military Studies Office a case study entitled “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War?” in which they posited that well-equipped nations do not want to wage war with the United States, because U.S. weapons are technically superior. Oddly, less capable nations have a stronger position. “At present, the countries that have a large supply of high-tech weaponry are few and unlikely to go to war with the United States in the near future. Now, the only effective way for a technologically less-advanced country to fight a technologically-advanced country is through guerrilla war. Guerrilla war, a test of national will and the ability to endure, negates many of the advantages of technology.” Written in 1996, their report apparently fell on deaf ears, as the United States has now become bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.